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In Chile there is a public insurance system where people contribute a fixed percentage of
their income, and also a private system where people pay a premium based on their personal
characteristics. Using a large survey for 1996, we study the determinants of the decision to
buy a private health plan. We find that the probability of buying a private health plan is
positively correlated with income and living in areas with private health services providers.
This probability decreases as families become older, and with a larger proportion of fertile
age females. We also find that people who are more likely to demand health services prefer
to buy a private health plan, and that people enrolled in a private health plan increase their
use of health services. The segmentation observed in the health sector relates with the way
private insurers and the public insurance system set their premiums.
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I. Introduction
The Chilean health insurance system has a dual character. On the one
hand, there is a public insurance system where people contribute with a fixed
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percentage of their work income and receive health care services when
needed.1 On the other hand, there is a private health insurance system which
works as a traditional private insurance scheme.2 A set of health plans, with
different coverage levels, deductibles, and caps on expenses, is offered. People
pay a premium which is proportional to the expected cost of the health care
services demanded. Workers have to allocate a fixed percentage of their work
income to enroll themselves and their dependents into one of the health
insurance systems. If they opt for a private health plan, they can supplement
this minimum payment to have access to a more comprehensive health plan.
People who are not working can voluntarily buy private insurance, if they are
unable to do so they are covered by the public health system.
These two health insurance schemes are parts of a health care sector that
as a whole has a dual character. While people enrolled in the private health
insurance scheme have access to a wider range of health care providers, and
particularly to private providers offering services of higher quality, people
enrolled in the public security system are in general constrained to the public
providers, and have access to services of a lower quality allocated on a non –
price basis.
Although most workers are enrolled in the public system, after more than
15 years of development, the private system has become more mature and
consolidated. The private insurance system, which in its origin was only able
to enroll a small segment of upper-middle and high income households, has
experienced a significant expansion toward lower-middle income segments.
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This expansion has been the result of a growing commercial effort by private
insurers, who have developed more competitive products based on managed
care practices. These innovations have been introduced by the growing
difficulty private insurers were experiencing in transferring people from the
public system to the private system.
The major attraction of the private system is that it allows to a larger extent
access to providers offering medical services of a higher quality. Although
some of those enrolled in the public security scheme can opt for a fee for
service modality, its high cost forces the great majority of the beneficiaries to
use public providers. Cheaper private health plans entail significant co-
payments, and private health plans are usually not a convenient alternative
for low income people. On the other hand, the institutional design of the
private insurance system has led to practice risk selection. In order to be
competitive, private insurers have an incentive to exclude people with severe
medical conditions, or elderly people belonging to a higher risk class. Finally,
the attractiveness of private health plans are seriously impaired when, given
the geographical location of beneficiaries, there is not a network of private
health care providers.
In this context, it is interesting to understand the determinants of people’s
enrollment decision into both health insurance alternatives. This would allow
a better understanding of the determinants of access to private health plans,
as well as the magnitude of the selection biases faced by the public system
and private insurers. This paper has four objectives; to study the determinants
of the decision to enroll into a private health plan; to characterize people
enrolled in both health insurance schemes from a social and economic
standpoint; to analyze if people who are more likely to demand health services
are also more likely to choose a private health plan, and to evaluate if having
a private health increases the demand for health services associated with non
–catastrophic medical conditions.3
3 By catastrophic medical conditions we mean illness entailing a relatively large expenditure
considering the person’s income, or chronic medical conditions leading to large and periodic
medical expenses.160 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Some of these issues have been studied by Sapelli and Torche (1998).
Using data from the Casen 1990 and 1994 surveys, the authors study the
determinants of the decision to contribute to the public system or to buy a
private health plan. This work introduces a methodological innovation. Sapelli
and Torche  (1998) use too simple a framework to study how health status
affects people’s decision between the alternatives, and their results are likely
to be biased because they did not control for endogeneity. To overcome this
shortcoming, we use a simultaneous equations model which enables us to
identify the extend private providers select risk based on public information,
the selection bias faced by private insurers due to people having private
information on their health status, and the extend health services demanded
increases when people have a private health plan. We also use a more recent
survey from 1996 in our study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly surveys the recent
literature on the demand for health insurance. Section III discusses what
determines the choice of a private health plan by households, and the data
used for these determinants. In section IV, using the data, we characterize
people enrolled in the private and public insurance system. Section V presents
a simple model of health insurance choice and discusses its estimation. Section
VI discusses the results and analysis the economic importance of the
determinants for different types of households. Section VII concludes with
some final remarks on our findings and relating them with some aspects of
the actual debate on the policy arena.
II. The Choice and Demand of Health Insurance
The choice of a health insurance plan is driven by two sets of determinants
which are closely related, but are analytically separable –the characteristics
of the health plan itself, and the personal characteristics of the individual
making the choice.
A series of works have highlighted the importance of the characteristics
of the health plans offered. For example, Feldman et al. (1987) studied the161 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
determinants of the individuals’ choice among health plans for employees of
a group of firms. They found that the choice among different health plans
were strongly sensitive to the prospective payments the individual would have
to make when demanding medical services. In a similar work, Short and Taylor
(1989) found that the prices of the different health plans, as well as the existence
of coverage for hospital expenses and catastrophic illnesses, constitute relevant
dimensions in the choice among alternative health plans. Both determinants
also appeared to be important in the work by Ellis (1989). Mechanic et al.
(1990) studied the importance of the degree of freedom in choosing a health
care provider on the choice among different health plans. They found that, in
the United States, people with a higher level of education, Caucasian, older,
and with a smaller number of children, preferred health plans that allowed a
larger freedom to choose the provider.
With respect to the personal characteristics of the individual choosing
health insurance, an important determinant is the level of income. People
with very low income, or those who are unemployed, usually do not have
access to health insurance when it is not mandatory and publicly provided.
This has been shown in the works by Swartz and McBridge (1990), Diehr et
al. (1991), and Swartz, Marcotte and McBride (1993).  Income level does not
only influence the decision of having health insurance but also the type of
health plan that is acquired. At low income levels people demand cheaper
insurance, that is to say with a lower coverage. This relationship has been
shown in several works, among them Cameron at al.  (1988), Cameron and
Trivedi (1991), Feldman et al. (1987) and Short and Taylor (1989).
The demand for health insurance is intimately related to the demand for
medical services. People with private information on their health status, who
think that their probability of generating medical expenses is high, will buy
health insurance with larger coverage than those with a better health status,
who do not expect to generate large medical expenses. This adverse selection
effect has been discussed among others by Hsiao (1995) and Cutler and
Zeckhauser (1997), and has been empirically studied by Mc Call et al. (1991),
Marquis (1992), and Browne and Doerpinhaus (1993). Another way the162 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
demand for health insurance is linked to the demand for health insurance is
that people who already have a health insurance face a lower cost of demanding
health care services, and therefore they will demand services to a larger extent
that they would have if uninsured. This moral hazard effect has been considered
in the work of Cameron et al. (1988), who analyzed the combined
determination of the demand for medical services and health insurance.
The literature studying the demand for health insurance and its determinants
refers for the most part to the reality of the United States, where there is a
system of private health insurance closely connected to the workplace.
However, the Chilean health care sector has a dual character where a public
sector coexists with private insurers and providers. For that matter, the Chilean
health sector resembles to a larger extent some European mixed systems,
where a significant public sector exists in parallel with a private sector
providing health insurance and medical services. The demand for health
insurance in this context has been studied by Zweifel (1982), van de Ven and
van de Praag (1981a and 1981b), and Propper (1989 and 1993). This last
author explores the determinants of the decision of acquiring private health
insurance in England, where a public health insurance financed by means of
taxes is mandatory, and coexists with private insurers who offer supplementary
health insurance allowing access to higher quality health care providers.
III. The Determinants of Households’ Choice of Health
Insurance System and the Data
In general, studies focusing on the choice among alternative health
insurance options consider both the characteristics of the health plans offered,
and the personal characteristics of the individuals making the choice.
Nevertheless, given the characteristics of the Chilean private health insurance
system and the available data, it is impossible to consider the characteristics
of the health plans offered. The level of co-payments for different medical
services, the degree of freedom to choose providers, the coverage for hospital
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among private health plans, and they are not easily comparable with the one
offered by the public insurance system. Moreover, there is no data set available
containing information on the characteristics of private health plans held by
people. The available data set comes from the Chilean National
Characterization Survey (CASEN) for 1996. This survey describes the social
and economic characteristics of Chilean families, including information on
income, housing, education, health, and labor. Therefore, following Propper
(1989 and 1993), we circumscribe our analysis to study the effect of
households’ characteristics on the choice between a private and a public health
insurance.
Our unit of study corresponds to individuals working under a contract
deciding whether to contribute to the public insurance system or getting a
private health plan. Within each household, we consider as a decision maker
the head of the household. If the spouse also works under a contract it is
considered as an independent decision maker. By the same token, any of the
offspring, older than 25, or older than 18 and not studying or handicapped,
working under a contract is also considered as an independent decision maker.
Other members of the household, who legally qualify as dependent, were
considered as being dependent on the head of the household.4 We have 20,181
observations in our sample (representing 2,475,282 individuals5), and 50.21%
of the people deciding which health insurance scheme to enroll have chosen
a private health plan.
The determinants of the choice between both health insurance systems
considered in the study are: age, income, health status, and an observable risk
index of the individual and his or her dependents. These independent variables
are constructed as follows, and the descriptive statistics of the variables are
shown in Table 1.
4 We eliminated from the sample those households who were enrolled in special health
insurance plans such as those of the Armed Forces, student health services, etc. Those
households did not represent more than a 5% of the total number of observations.
5 Chilean population is about 15 millions.164 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Income: We use as income the total disposable income of the individual
deciding whether to contribute to the public insurance system or buy a private
health plan. The average income in our sample is $242,373, but it shows a
large variance and its standard deviation is $335,040.
Age: We directly used the age of the individual choosing a health insurance
as an independent variable. The average age of the decision maker in our
sample is 36.7 years, with a standard deviation of 11.1 years.
Risk index: While the contribution to the public security system is
proportional to work income, private health plans discriminate among different
age and gender groups. Elderly people and women of fertile age pay a higher
premium than young people and men when enrolling the private system,
because they are expected to generate higher medical expenses. On the other
hand, in order to be competitive, insurers have incentives to perform risk
selection when pooling risk by excluding from their health plans those people
belonging to a high risk class. Therefore, the gender and age composition of
the household affects the possibilities to get a private health plan. Based on
the actual relative price structure of one of the main private insurers, we
construct an index of perceived risk using the age and gender of the individual
choosing health insurance and his dependents. The value of the index
corresponds to the sum of the corresponding score assigned to each member
based on his/her gender and age as shown in the Appendix. The value of the
index for our sample ranges from 1 (corresponding to a young male) to 9.24.
The average value of the index is 2.46, with a high standard deviation (4.72).
Health status: Although the premium charged in a private health plan in
Chile is proportional to the perceived risk based on age and gender, the
likelihood of generating medical expenses depends to a greater extent on
people’s health status, which is private information not known by the private
insurer.6 Those people with poor health conditions, but who do not have a pre
6 As shown by Van de Ven and van Vliet (1994), when only age and sex are used to
differentiate risk among different individuals a very small proportion of the total variation
among individual risks is explained. In Chile, private insurer can only set prices based on
age and gender and can not deny coverage. Pre screening medical conditions is not allowed.165 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
existing severe illness which has to be declared when signing for a private
health plan, knowing that they face a larger probability of generating medical
expenses, will be more likely to get a private health plan offering larger
coverage and access to better health care providers. The information in our
database is limited to the actual demand of different health services during
the last period. Therefore, we need to assume that people who have demanded
more health services in the past are more likely to be sick in the future.
Following Sapelli and Torche (1998), we construct an index of health status
for the individual and his dependents based on different indicators. The first
indicator is the number of medical visits during the last 3 months. The second
indicator is the number of surgeries or hospitalization of the members of the
household during the last 3 months. We also include three dummy variables
indicating; whether the members of the household had an accident during the
last 3 months, whether one of the members had a child, and whether they buy
medicine. To reduce the dimensionality of this multivariate data, we construct
the index using the first principal components.
This strategy to create a proxy for peoples’ health status has two
shortcomings. First, there may be some people demanding medical services
who suffered a long term severe medical condition. This people are required
to declare it at the moment of applying to a private health plan, and private
insurer can deny covering the expenses associated to those conditions.
Therefore, the existence of long term severe medical conditions may hinder
the possibility of getting a private health plan, rather than make it more likely.
A second problem is that past demand of health services relates to the decision
to enroll a private plan beyond the selection bias we already referred to. People
who already have a private plan with larger coverage than the one offered by
the public insurer face a lower pocket cost when demanding medical services,
and are more likely use them more intensively. In our estimations, we have to
take into account explicitly the endogeneity of this variable. The average
value of the health status index in our sample is 2.71, but it shows a large
standard deviation of 4.72.166 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Access to private providers: The benefits of buying a private health plan
are intimately related to the access to higher quality health care providers.
Therefore, the availability of a network of private providers in the area an
individual lives is an important determinant on the choice of a private health
plan.  Hence, people living in rural areas, or in low density urban areas, where
this network of higher quality health care providers does not exist, are less
likely to buy a private health plan. We classified the different districts into
high density urban areas, and the rest. Therefore, if the individual lives in a
district which had more than 70,000 people living in its urban area by 1992 a
dummy takes the value of 1, and zero otherwise. In our sample, 74.6% of
people deciding which insurance system to choose lived in an area with private
providers.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Continuous variables Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Income 242,372 335,040 1 5,707,828
Age 36.7 11.1 17 95
Risk 2.46 1.27 1 9.24
Health status 2.71 4.72 0 82.99
Categorical variables    % of observations
Private health plan 50.21
Private providers 74.60
Number observations 20,181167 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
IV. Characterizing People Enrolled on both Systems
In this section, we characterize people enrolling in both health security
schemes based on their income, age, perceived risk, health status, and whether
they live in an area with private providers. In Table 2, we show the percentage
of people who enrolled each insurance system for 5 quintiles ordered from
lower to higher income.
Table 2. Stratified Analysis of Enrollment
Variable Private plan Public insurance Mean test
1st income quintile (%) 17.30 82.70 0.00
2nd income quintile (%) 30.50 69.50 0.00
3rd income quintile (%) 41.80 58.20 0.00
4th income quintile (%) 59.40 40.60 0.00
5th income quintile (%) 82.90 17.10 0.00
Mean health status 2.75 2.69 0.28
Mean age 36.13 37.30 0.00
Mean risk 2.34 2.59 0.00
Private providers (%) 85.00 64.00 0.00
The percentage of people in the lower quintile enrolled in a private health
plan is only 17.3%, and this percentage increases steadily as income rises. In
the upper income quintile almost 83% of people are enrolled in a private
health plan. This suggests that income is a mayor determinant in the decision
of which insurance system to enroll.
Table 2 also shows that people enrolled in a private health plan is in average
slightly younger than people enrolled in the public insurance system. Although
the difference on the average age is small, the difference is statistically
significant as implied by the mean test that lead us to reject the null hypothesis
that the average age of the two groups are equal.168 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
With respect to the insurer perceived risk index, the average risk of people
enrolled in a private health plan is 2.34, and is lower than the average risk of
those enrolled in the public insurance system, which is 2.59. This difference
is statically significant, and suggests that private insurer enroll better risk
than the public insurance system based on publicly available information.
The statistics also show that a large percentage of people enrolled in a
private health plan, 85%, lived in an area where there were private providers.
This percentage is lower for those choosing the public insurance system. This
indicates that the availability of private providers is also important in choosing
the insurance system.
With respect to the health status of the people enrolled in both systems
there is not a significant statistical difference. The average value of our index
is similar for people enrolled in a private plan and people enrolled in the
public system.
This descriptive analysis of peoples enrolled in private health plans and
the public system lead us to estimate a model of health insurance choice based
on these characteristics.
V. A Simple Model of Health Insurance Choice
Building on the framework offered by Besley (1989), and used by Selden
(1993), we present a simple model of health insurance choice. Consider a
consumer who faces ex-ante uncertainty with respect to an illness severity
parameter θ with distribution F(θ) with θ  [θ0, θ1]. The consumer’s utility
function is strictly increasing and concave,
where, C denotes consumption of non-health goods, and y denotes health.
The individual is assumed to produce health through a well-behaved
concave production function,
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where X denotes health services, P is a vector of personal characteristics, and
￿g / ￿X > 0 and ￿g / ￿θ < 0. Thus given θ, the individual can improve his or
her health by purchasing health services.
The individual has two possibilities of getting health insurance. Whether
to contribute a fraction Ω of his income to the public security system and to
get a state specific lump-sum compensation S(θ). Otherwise, he can buy a
private health plan, where he pays a premium m(R) and receives a fraction α
of the total costs of the health services consumed, where R is a risk index
based on age and gender.
If the individual opts to contribute to the public security system, given an
exogenously determined level of income I, an insurance payment program
S(θ), and a realized value of θ, he solves in each state the following problem,
From the first order condition for utility maximization, we can derive the
state specific demand function for health services,
and the state dependent indirect utility function is written as,
If the individual chooses to buy a private health plan, given his exogenously
determined level of income I, a premium m(R), and a realized value of θ, he
solves in each state the following problem,
(2)
[] ) P , ), ( X ( g ), ( X I ) ( S I U Max ) ( X θ θ θ Ω θ θ − − + (3)
) P , , I ) ( S I ( X X θ Ω θ − + = (4)
[ ), P , , I ) ( S I ( X I ) ( S I U ) P , , I ) ( S I ( V θ Ω θ Ω θ θ Ω θ − + − − + = − + (5)
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Then, from the first order conditions, for a given α, we can derive a state
specific demand function for health services,
X = X(I - m(R), α, θ, P)
and the state specific indirect utility function can be written as,
Assuming a competitive private insurance market and zero administrative
costs, the equilibrium contract is actually fair, therefore,
Since insurance is purchased ex ante, the individual will choose to buy a
private health plan if the expected utility of this option is greater than the
expected utility of contributing to the public security system, which can be
expressed by means of a function corresponding to the difference in expected
utility, ∆V,
In order to estimate the model, we assume that the difference in expected
utility for each individual can be modeled as,
[] ) P , ), ( X ( g ), ( X ) ( ) R ( m I U Max ) ( X θ θ θ α θ − − − 1 (6)
(7)
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where HSi is the individual’s health status, Z1i is a vector of the other variables
determining the choice of a private health plan, δ1 and β1 are parameters to be
estimated, and ￿1i is an error term representing the collective contribution to
∆Vi of unmeasured characteristics which is assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and variance 1.7 ∆Vi cannot be directly observed, we only
observe if the individual buys the private health plan or not, and an index
variable taking the value of 1 if ∆Vi  > 0 (i.e. if the person gets a private health
plan) can be used to estimate a probit model.
As it is implied by (4) and (7), the actual demand for health services is
endogenous to the health insurance system chosen by the individual, and a
model accounting for this joint endogeneity is needed. Therefore, we assume
that the actual demand of health services can be modeled as,
where Z2i  is a vector of variables determining the demand of health services
other than the health insurance system chosen by the individual.
Considering the determinants of the choice between a private health plan
and the public insurance, we specified the model such as the Z1i vector includes:
income, income square, age, risk and private providers. As determinant of
the demand for health services, we include in vector Z2i the set of exogenous
variables determining the demand for health services. Health care services
demanded, being normal goods, are expected to increase as income rises. We
also expect that the older the individual the larger is his demand for health
services. We also include the square of age to capture an eventual non linearity.
The demand for health care services is also expected to be positively correlated
i i i i Z HS V 1 1 1 1 ￿ β δ ∆ + + = (11)
i i i i Z V HS 2 2 2 2 ￿ β ∆ δ + + = (12)
7 The normalization of the variance is an innocuous standarization because the parameter
vector β can be identified only up to a factor of proportionality.172 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
with age and gender composition of the individual and his dependents, so we
include the perceived risk index. In order to test for non linearities in the
estimation of the probability of having a private health plan, we included
income squared.8
Because the index variable indicating the enrollment to a private health
plan is discrete, we cannot imbed this analysis in a standard simultaneous
equations framework. Instead, we use a latent variable model first discussed
by Heckman (1978) and used by Bollen et al. (1995), and Norton et al. (1998a
and 1998b) among others, which allows us to make a simultaneous estimation
of  (11)  and  (12).  To  estimate  the  model  we  follow  Maddala  (1983,  ch.8,
pp. 242-247), who presents a two-stage procedure based on the work of Nelson
and Olson (1978) and Amemiya (1979).
VI. The Results
The results for the estimation are presented in Table 3. These results show
that the probability of an individual and his dependents having a private health
plan increases with income, although at a decreasing rate. This probability is
also positively correlated with the household living in an area with nearby
private providers. One point which is interesting to note is the negative relation
existing between the probability of having a private health plan and the age
of the household head. The older the individual the less likely it is that he has
a private health plan. By the same token, the perceived risk index is also
negatively related to the possibility of having a private health plan. The older
the individual and his dependents, or the larger the percentage of females, the
lower the probability of having private health insurance.
Our Health status variable has a positive correlation with the probability
8 Alternative specifications for the covariates including education and interactive income-
education were also run. However, the results for the coefficients of main interest did not
changed significantly. We only present the specification without education to avoid
multicollinearity problems associated with the correlation between income and education.173 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Table 3. Simultaneous Equation Estimation
Dependent variable Health Probability of having a private
status health plan
Variable OLS Probit Probit (*)
(Marginal effects)
Private health plan 0.85    
(14.59)   
Health status   0.064 0.025
  (13.699)
Income -0.01 0.436 0.173
(-0.88) (312.30)
Income-square  -0.008 -0.003
  (-197.02)
Age 0.14 -0.004 -0.002
(8.73) (-9.02)
Age-square -0.003   
(-14.03)   
Risk 1.63 -0.264 -0.105
(55.15) (-35.04)




Observations 20,181 20,181 20,181
Log-likelihood --- -1,382,756.8 -1,382,756.8
Adj. R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.194 0.194
Notes: t-test in parenthesis. *Marginal Effects are computed at the sample average value of
the variables. For “Private providers” a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1
was used.174 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
of having a private health plan, suggesting that less healthier people are more
likely to get a private health plan with better coverage than the publicly
provided health insurance. This effect could be interpreted as evidence of an
adverse selection bias in the enrollment into private health plans. People who
are more likely to demand health services prefer to buy a private health plan.
To see the economic significance of the covariates, let’s consider their
impact on the average probability of having a private health plan. The average
probability of having a private health plan in our sample is 0.539,9 which is
very close to the observed unconditional sample frequency 0.502. The marginal
effect of income is 0.173 and -0.003 for income squared, meaning that when
income doubles the probability of having a private health plan increases to
0.847. Therefore, income is a major determinant on the decision to buy a
private health plan. We analyze this income effect in more details below.
The same is true for the possibility to have access to private providers of
health care services. When the individual does not live in an area with nearby
private providers the probability of buying a private plan decreases to 0.393,
which denotes the importance of having access to better quality health care
services in the decision of buying a private health plan.
The probability of having a private health plan for our sample drops to
0.47 (a drop of 13% in the average probability) if the household did not use
any health service during the last three months. This latter finding implies
important evidence of adverse selection bias. People expecting to demand
health services prefer to buy a private health plan.
One of the characteristics of probit models is that changes in the probability
are non linear on the value of the covariates. To see the economic significance
of changes in covariates for different family types, we have defined nine
baseline families based on their income and their stage in the life cycle. With
respect to income, we define three types of families; low income families
with a monthly income of $150,519 (Chilean pesos), middle income families
with a monthly income of $242,373, and high income families with monthly
9 The average sample probability is evaluated at the average values of the covariates.175 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
income of $677.294.10 With respect to their stage in the life cycle, we also
define three categories: young, middle aged, and older. Our young baseline
family is composed of a male household head aged 35, a spouse aged 30, a
female offspring aged 6 and a male offspring aged 4. The middle aged baseline
family is composed of a male household head aged 50, a spouse aged 45, a
female offspring aged 21 and a male offspring aged 19. The old baseline
family is formed only by a male household head aged 67 and his spouse aged
61. Also, the baseline families have used the health services in the past 3
months at the average sample rate, and live in an area with private providers.
The probability of having a private health plan for each of these baseline
families, and its change when no private provider exists or there were no
demand for health services are reported in Table 4.
10 Low income corresponds to the average value of the 3rd quintile. Medium income
corresponds to the sample average value of income, and high income corresponds to the
average income of the 5th quintile.
Table 4. Probability of Private Health Plan for Family Types
Type of family Young Medium age Old
family family family
Low income Baseline 0.36 0.22 0.11
No private providers 0.20 0.10 0.05
No health services 0.30 0.17 0.08
Medium income Baseline 0.51 0.35 0.20
No private providers 0.32 0.19 0.09
No health services 0.44 0.29 0.16
High income Baseline 0.95 0.89 0.78
No private providers 0.87 0.76 0.61
No health services 0.93 0.85 0.72176 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
As can be seen, the probability of having a private health plan decreases
as households get older, and this effect is greater for low income families.
While for low income families the probability of having a private health plan
when older is less than a third of the probability when young (drops from
0.36 to 0.11), for high income families this probability reduces only by 18%
when old (drops from 0.95 to 0.78). Older families are less likely to have a
private health plan, but their exclusion is hampered as income rises. This
suggests that the main problem to keep a private health plan when old is the
increase in its price.
The economic effect of not living in an area with nearby private providers
turns to be very significant for low income families, but it fades as income
rises. When a low income young family lives in an area with no private
providers nearby the probability of having a private health plan drops from
0.36 to 0.20 (i.e. in 44%). Nevertheless, if this same family has a high income,
its probability of having a private health plan drops only from 0.95 to 0.87
(i.e. only a 8.5%). A similar pattern is observed for medium age and old
families. A possible reason for this is that the existence of private providers
nearby is not that important for higher income families because they can afford
traveling if they need medical services.
The economic effect of not having used medical services in the last three
months is only marginal for high income families, but it becomes important
as income decline. For example, the probability of having a private health
plan drops only from 0.95 to 0.93 (i.e. only 2%) for young high income
families. But, for low and middle income young families this probability drops
from 0.36 to 0.30 (i.e. 17%) and from 0.51 to 0.44 (i.e. 14%) respectively.
The same pattern is shown for medium age and old families. This result
suggests that low and medium income families expecting to demand health
services in the future are more likely to buy a private health plan, and that
high income families buy a private plan independent if they expect or not to
use health services in the future.
Another interesting finding is that the likelihood of buying a private health
plan, when expecting to use medical services in the future, is larger for medium177 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
age and old families compared with young ones. This suggests that private
insurers are more likely to enroll high more costly families than the average
in the medium age and old groups.
Our estimation also allows us to study the effect of having a private health
plan on the demand for health services. The average sample value of our
index measuring the use of health services, based on the actual demand for
health services during the last three months, is 2.715, rather close of the
predicted value, 2.718. As shown in Table 3, the demand for health services
is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of having a private
health plan, with age, and the existence of fertile females and elderly members
in the family, but negatively correlated with income.  The positive correlation
between the demand of health services and having a private health plan
suggests that families having a private insurance consume more medical
services than families enrolled in the public insurance system. Many factors
can explain this behavior. First, private health plan usually offer larger coverage
than the public insurance and therefore pocket costs of medical services are
lower for people enrolled in a private health plan. Second, most people enrolled
in the public insurance system can only get health services from public
providers, and are rationed by means of queues and waiting lists, and therefore
they face an extra cost. Third, most private health plans consider, at least to
some extend, a fee for service compensation mechanism. This can result in
private providers inducing demand for health services.
An interesting finding is that this behavior does not differ across family
types. In Table 5 we show the percentage change in the demand for health
care services when households do not have a private health plan for our nine
family types.
Young families reduce their use of health care services by 16% when they
do not have a private health plan, and this reduction is equal for any level of
income. The same behavior is observed for old families independent of their
income. The effect of not having a private health plan is similar for medium
age families, who reduce their use of medical services by 14% when they do
not have a private health plan no matter their income.178 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 5. Average Health Services Demanded for Different Family Types
Type of family Young Medium age Old
family family family
Low income With private plan 5.42 6.13 5.19
No private plan 4.58 5.29 4.34
Change (%) -0.16 -0.14 -0.16
Medium income With private plan 5.41 6.12 5.18
No private plan 4.57 5.27 4.33
Change (%) -0.16 -0.14 -0.16
High income With private plan 5.35 6.05 5.11
No private plan 4.50 5.21 4.27
Change (%) -0.16 -0.14 -0.17
VII. Conclusion
The main findings of this paper are that the most important factors
determining the decision to buy a private health plan are: income, age and
gender composition of the household, whether people live in an area with
private providers and their health status. By charging a premium contingent
on age and gender, as families become older, and there is more female members
in fertile age, the cost of the insurance rise, and low income people get excluded
from the private health insurance system. Therefore, the way premiums are
set in private health plans and the public insurance system generates a selection
bias on people enrolled in the public insurance system. Older families, or
families with more female in fertile age, unable to pay the higher premiums
of a private health plan end enrolled in the public insurance paying a fixed
percentage of their income. This selection bias is due mainly to the way
premiums are set in both insurance schemes. While in the private insurance
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people and women on fertile age are expected to be more expensive), in the
public insurance system the premium relates only to their income.
The positive correlation of the probability of having a private health plan
and the indicator of health status, constructed using private information not
known by private insurers, shows that people with poor health conditions are
more willing to buy a private health plan. This behavior creates a bias in the
type of people who decides to buy a private health plan. Those who expect
not to demand a large amount of medical services are not willing to pay as
much as those who do expect to consume a larger amount. This adverse
selection can put private insurers at financial risks. Nevertheless, an important
caveat to interpret this result is that our analysis was based on a cross section
of households, and therefore the adverse selection bias can only be interpreted
as a short run effect.
Private insurers are not allowed to deny coverage, except for pre existing
medical conditions, and cannot pre screen potential enrollees to set their
premium. Therefore, in the short run there is room for people who do not
have a long term medical condition but expect to have large medical expenses
to choose a private plan instead of the public insurance. However, in the long
run, there is a way private insurers can cream-skim their risk and avoid any
major financial risk of collapse. Given that insurers can change their premium
on an annually basis, if people get a long term and expensive medical condition
their premium rises and can be forced to migrate to the public insurance system
if unable to afford it.11 Consequently, in the long run the adverse selection
bias could be on the public insurance system. Although there is anecdotal
evidence of this, the lack of data prevents a more systematic study. If data
would be available, a natural extension of our work would be to study the
enrollment to private health plan using a panel of individuals.
Our finding that people enrolled in a private plan demand more medical
11 Although the regulation does not allow private insurers to charge a higher premium to
some of the people in a given health plan, private insurers move good risks to a new plan
and increase the premium of the plan where poor risks are pooled.180 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
services than those enrolled in the public insurance is also interesting, but the
causes of such behavior are hard to disentangle. To discriminate whether this
behavior is due to pure moral hazard by enrollees, or is explained by an induced
demand by health care providers, or because medical services in the public
sector are quantity rationed, would require a much rich data set that the one
we used and which is not available. Further study of the correlation between
holding a private plan and a larger expenditure in health services is justified
for its economic implications. If consumers demand more health services
when having a private health plan than when they have to pay the full cost,
from a social standpoint, there is over expenditure on medical services. This
is so, because the number of interventions is larger than the socially desirable
and they can be non cost-effective. The same is true if a larger expenditure on
health services is induced by providers. Since the late nineties, private insurers
have being promoting health plans where enrollees’ choice of providers is
limited, and the insurance company share risk with providers. This move
toward a managed care scheme was partly motivated by the aim to curtail
moral hazard.
There have been many proposals to reform the health insurance system.
They are geared partially to finish a perceived unequal and unjust access to
medical services by poor and rich people. Our findings support this view in
the sense that only young and rich people can enjoy the benefits of a private
health plan, and olds and poor have to stay in the public insurance system
with limited access to medical services. Our findings also suggest that any
reform intended to finish with the segmentation of the health insurance system
should eliminate the duality in the way both health insurance schemes set
their premiums. Some of the proposed reforms consider to make the public
insurance system more like a private health plan, and set the contribution
made by enrollees contingent on their risk and not on their income. This
measure, coupled with others intended to allow people enrolled in the public
insurance system to use to a larger extend private providers of health services,
would hinder the dual character of both insurance schemes. To secure universal
access to health insurance, it would be necessary to set a subsidy to people181 CHOOSING HEALTH INSURANCE IN A DUAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
unable to pay for their insurance. Many proposal ranging from a universal
redistribution fund to less comprehensive cross subsidy systems within each
insurer have been discussed. The main shortcoming of all these proposals is
their lack of hard data and evidence to evaluate their effects on people’s
behavior. More empirical work on the Chilean health insurance market is
needed; unfortunately this effort is severely limited by the lack of suitable
data.
Appendix
Table A.  Relative Prices in Private Health Insurance Plans for 1996
Age Male Female Male Female
affiliate affiliate dependent  dependent
Age ≤ 18 years - - 0.54 0.54
18 ≤ Age ≤39 -- 0.79 1.5
Age ≤ 40 years 1 1.6 - -
40 ≤ Age ≤ 54 1.3 1.5 1 1.32
55 ≤ Age ≤60 2.3 2.3 1.79 1.79
Age ⊕ 61 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.7
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on actual prices from a major insurer.
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